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REFUSING ADVANCE REFUSALS: ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
AND LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT  
LINDY WILLMOTT,∗ BEN WHITE† AND MICHELLE 
HOWARD‡ 
[The law recognises the right of a competent adult to make an advance refusal of life-sustaining medical 
treatment. However, this right is not unqualified and there are circumstances in which a health 
professional or a court will be permitted to disregard an advance directive. Underpinning this qualified 
right is the tension between the principles of self-determination or autonomy, and sanctity of life. This 
article explores the excuses available in Australia to health professionals who do not wish to comply with 
an advance directive. It compares the common law with those jurisdictions that have enacted legislation, 
and evaluates and critiques the different excuses available.] 
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I   IN T R O D U C T I O N 
There has not been an Australian case that has directly considered whether a 
competent adult has a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Neverthe-
less, there seems little doubt in the literature that this right would be recognised as 
forming part of Australia’s common law should the issue ever be tested.1 Certainly, 
such a right has been endorsed in other common law jurisdictions, including in the 
United States,2 Canada,3 New Zealand4 and the United Kingdom.5 These jurisdic-
tions have also recognised that an adult may make a decision to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment in advance of the medical situation arising.6 Again, the 
Australian courts have not yet directly considered whether the recognition of such 
directives forms part of the common law of this country but it is generally accepted 
that this is the case.7  
Some Australian jurisdictions have put the matter beyond doubt by legislating to 
recognise the right of an adult to refuse treatment in advance. Legislation providing 
for advance directives has been enacted in the Australian Capital Territory,8 the 
Northern Territory,9 Queensland,10 South Australia11 and Victoria.12 Although the 
 
 1 Cameron Stewart, ‘Advanced Directives, the Right to Die and the Common Law: Recent Problems 
with Blood Transfusions’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 161, 173–8; John Black-
wood, ‘“I Would Rather Die with Two Feet than Live with One”; The Status and Legality of Ad-
vance Directives in Australia’ (1997) 19 University of Queensland Law Journal 270, 278–81; Loane 
Skene, Law and Medical Practice: Rights, Duties, Claims and Defences (2nd ed, 2004) 296–7. 
 2 Cruzan v Director of Missouri Department of Health, 497 US 261 (1990); Vacco v Quill, 521 US 
793 (1997). 
 3 Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385; Malette v Schulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 
321. 
 4 Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201; Auckland Area Health Board v A-G (NZ) [1993] 1 NZLR 235. See also 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 11, although it refers only to refusing medical treatment 
in general terms. 
 5 Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 (‘Re B’); Re C (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819 (‘Re C’); Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; Re T 
(Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 (‘Re T’); R (Burke) v General Medical 
Council [2006] QB 273 (‘R (Burke) Appeal’). 
 6 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 Fam Law R 408; Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819; Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff), 892 (Lord Mustill); Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 653, 
662–3 (Lord Donaldson MR), 665–6 (Butler-Sloss LJ), 669 (Staughton LJ); Malette v Shulman 
(1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321; R (Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] QB 424 (‘R (Burke)’) (al-
though note that the Court of Appeal suggested caution in relying on aspects of Munby J’s judgment 
in future cases: R (Burke) Appeal [2006] QB 273, 295). 
 7 This accords with the view expressed in Queensland Law Reform Commission, Assisted and 
Substituted Decisions: Decision-Making by and for People with a Decision-Making Disability, 
Report No 49 (1996) vol 1, 357. Further, although not expressly addressing the point, the Victorian 
Court of Appeal in Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 (Unre-
ported, Winneke P, Brooking and Ormiston JJA, 17 September 1998) and the High Court in refusing 
special leave to appeal (Qumsieh v Pilgrim (2000) 21(4) Leg Rep SL 3d) seemed to accept that a 
common law advance directive would be binding. The missed opportunity to discuss the right to 
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment is discussed in Cameron Stewart, ‘Qumsieh’s Case, Civil 
Liability and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment’ (2000) 8 Journal of Law and Medicine 56. 
 8 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT). 
 9 Natural Death Act 1988 (NT). 
 10 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld). The Queensland regime is discussed at some length in Ben 
White and Lindy Willmott, ‘Rethinking Life-Sustaining Measures: Questions for Queensland’ (Is-
sues Paper, Queensland University of Technology, 2005) <http://www.law.qut.edu.au/files/ 
QUT_LifeSustainingIssuesPaper.pdf>. 
 11 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA). 
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statutes vary significantly in scope and operation, all allow an adult, in certain 
circumstances, to complete a directive refusing life-sustaining medical treatment at 
a future time when that adult no longer has capacity to make the decision. Other 
states are also considering legislative recognition of advance directives. In Western 
Australia, a current review of the law on medical treatment for the dying is giving 
consideration to whether the right to make an advance directive should be statuto-
rily enshrined.13 A Bill that would provide for advance directives has also been 
recently introduced into the Tasmanian Parliament.14 In most jurisdictions where 
advance directives are recognised by statute, provision is also made for the common 
law to continue to operate, giving rise to a two-tier system.15 
A failure to follow an advance directive, including one that refuses life-sustaining 
medical treatment, attracts legal consequences. Providing treatment without 
consent16 brings with it the possibility of the health professional facing both 
criminal and civil liability.17 Criminal charges of assault or battery18 may be laid 
and the adult may also pursue a civil claim for trespass to the person.19 Some 
jurisdictions with legislation on the issue also create a separate criminal offence.20 
However, there are circumstances in which it is appropriate that an advance 
directive not be followed. Certainly the situation is more complex when a refusal of 
life-sustaining medical treatment is contained in an advance directive than when 
given at the time the decision needs to be made. In the latter case, there is scope for 
a health professional to discuss the issues with the adult and explore any doubts the 
health professional might have. If relying on an advance directive, there is no such 
opportunity and difficulties may arise in relation to issues such as what the adult 
intended their directive to cover or whether it should apply to the particular 
situation that has arisen.  
 
 12 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic). 
 13 Attorney-General and Minister for Health, Western Australia, ‘Medical Treatment for the Dying’ 
(Discussion Paper, Department of Health, Western Australia, 2005). 
 14 Directions for Medical Treatment Bill 2005 (Tas). 
 15 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 5; Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 5; Medical Treatment Act 
1988 (Vic) s 4. The South Australian legislation is silent about the effect of the legislation on the 
common law, but in the absence of a provision to the contrary, common law rights would continue to 
apply: Cameron Stewart, ‘The Australian Experience of Advance Directives and Possible Future 
Directions’ (2005) 24 Australasian Journal on Ageing S25, S26. Due to a drafting error when enact-
ing Queensland’s guardianship regime (comprised of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld)), the authors are of the view that the common law 
regime no longer applies in Queensland: see Ben White and Lindy Willmott, ‘Will You Do as I Ask? 
Compliance with Instructions about Health Care in Queensland’ (2004) 4 Queensland University of 
Technology Law and Justice Journal 77, 77−8, 83. 
 16 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider when the provision of treatment without consent may 
be justified at law. However, in this regard, see generally Skene, above n 1, 83–170. 
 17 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v J W B (1992) 175 CLR 218, 232 (Mason 
CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (‘Marion’s Case’). 
 18 Note that in some jurisdictions, the crimes of assault and battery have been merged into a single 
offence. For example, in Queensland, the crime of assault as defined by Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 
245 includes what was battery at common law: White v Connolly [1927] St R Qd 75. 
 19 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider in detail the civil actions that may be available, but it 
is noted that other civil claims may also be possible: see generally Skene, above n 1, 39–47. See also 
Stewart, ‘Qumsieh’s Case’, above n 7, 59−67. 
 20 See, eg, Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 79; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 
6. 
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This article explores the excuses upon which health professionals can rely at 
common law and under Australian legislation21 to decline to follow valid advance 
directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.22 Part II explores a prelimi-
nary point on the issue of validity and what is required by common law and statute. 
Then, assuming that there is a valid advance directive in existence, Part III consid-
ers what excuses a health professional might be able to rely upon in relation to 
advance directives at common law. The common law has permitted nonadherence 
to such directives where the adult completing it would not have intended his or her 
refusal to apply to the circumstances that have actually arisen.23 Although there is a 
single test, the different categories of case that might arise are considered sepa-
rately. Part IV then examines the excuses available in relation to the various 
statutory provisions for advance directives.24 Finally comparison is made with the 
common law and suggestions are advanced in relation to the appropriateness of 
different statutory excuses. 
A  Preliminary Definitions 
A final point should be made in relation to terminology. For the sake of clarity, a 
number of standard terms are adopted throughout this article, irrespective of those 
which may be used in a particular statutory regime, or at common law, for equiva-
lent expressions. ‘Advance directive’ means instructions given by an adult about 
health care in advance of loss of capacity, intended to operate after loss of capac-
ity.25 ‘Life-sustaining medical treatment’ means treatment that sustains or prolongs 
the operation of vital bodily functions that are incapable of independent operation.26 
In this article, this includes treatment such as assisted ventilation, cardiopulmonary 
 
 21 For a recent comment on the current Australian experience regarding advance directives at common 
law and under statute, and their overall effectiveness in advance care planning, see Stewart, ‘The 
Australian Experience of Advance Directives’, above n 15, S28. 
 22 It does not therefore address the issue of demands in advance for treatment that is futile. In this 
regard, see R (Burke) [2005] QB 424 which was overturned by the Court of Appeal in R (Burke) 
Appeal [2006] QB 273.  
 23 Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Medical Law (3rd ed, 2000) 2037–8. 
 24 This article does not consider in detail the proposed legislative regime for Tasmania as set out in the 
Directions for Medical Treatment Bill 2005 (Tas). This Bill was introduced into the Tasmanian 
Parliament in June 2005, but debate has been adjourned to allow for further consideration of the 
issues, including the impact of the Respecting Patient Choices programme: Tasmania, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Council, 1 September 2005, 16–22 (Norma Jamieson). The Respecting Patient 
Choices programme promotes advance care planning and at the time of writing is being trialled in 
the Royal Hobart Hospital. 
 25 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 653 (Lord Donaldson MR) refers to an ‘anticipatory refusal’; Medical 
Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) ss 3, 6 refer to a ‘direction’ to refuse medical treatment; Natural Death 
Act 1988 (NT) s 4 refers to a ‘direction’ to refuse extraordinary measures; Powers of Attorney Act 
1998 (Qld) s 35 refers to an ‘advance health directive’; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative 
Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7 refers to an ‘anticipatory grant or refusal of consent to medical treatment’; 
Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) ss 3, 5 refer to a ‘refusal of treatment certificate’. 
 26 At common law, no standard terminology is used to refer to this type of treatment: see generally Re T 
[1992] 4 All ER 649; Re B [2002] 2 All ER 449; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 Fam Law R 
408. In the legislation, various terminology and definitions are used: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) sch 2 s 5A defines ‘life-sustaining measures’; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 3 and Medi-
cal Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 3 refer to ‘medical treatment’; Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 3 
refers to ‘extraordinary measures’; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) 
s 4 refers to ‘life sustaining measures’.  
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resuscitation, and artificial hydration and nutrition. ‘Health professional’ means a 
person who provides medical treatment to an adult.27 The term ‘excuse’ will be 
used generically to describe both provisions that permit a health professional not to 
follow an advance directive and those which actually prohibit reliance on such a 
document.28 Finally, this article considers advance directives that can be made by 
an ‘adult’, that is a person who has reached 18 years. Different laws apply to an 
advance directive purportedly made by a minor.29  
I I   AD VA N C E  DI R E C T I V E S  — VA L I D I T Y AT CO M M O N  LAW A N D  U N D E R  
STAT U T E   
The following provides an overview of when a common law advance directive 
and one made pursuant to statute will be regarded as valid. This is important to 
consider at the outset because a directive that is not valid is not binding and the 
later consideration of excuses for health professionals is premised on the existence 
of an advance directive that is otherwise binding. Limitations on the circumstances 
under which statutory advance directives refusing life-sustaining medical treatment 
can operate or be made are also briefly noted in this Part.  
A  Common Law Advance Directives 
For a common law advance directive to be valid, two requirements must be met.30 
First, the adult must have been competent at the time that the direction was given. 
This means that the adult had capacity to make the decision and was able to 
communicate the decision in some way.31 There have been many judicial pro-
nouncements on what is meant by the term ‘capacity’ and the law is now regarded 
as settled.32 Munby J recently summarised the test for capacity in the following 
way: 
 
 27 At common law, no standard terminology is used to refer to health professionals: see generally Re T 
[1992] 4 All ER 649; Re B [2002] 2 All ER 449; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 Fam Law R 
408. In the legislation, various terminology and definitions are used: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) sch 3 defines ‘health providers’; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 3 refers to ‘registered 
medical practitioners’; Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 3 refers to a ‘health professional’; 
Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 4 and Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 
(SA) s 4 refer to ‘medical practitioners’. 
 28 There are different approaches in different jurisdictions. For example, Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) s 103 excuses a health professional from liability if he or she chooses, on reasonable grounds, 
not to follow an advance directive. By contrast, Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 12 prohibits a 
health professional from following a directive in certain circumstances. 
 29  
 30 Some commentators suggest that there are four requirements for an anticipatory refusal of treatment 
to be valid: (1) that the patient be competent; (2) that there be no undue influence exerted on the 
patient when making the decision; (3) that the patient be sufficiently informed when making the 
decision; and (4) that the patient intend the refusal to apply to the situation that subsequently arose: 
see Kennedy and Grubb, above n 23, 2037. However, the authors of this article prefer the view that 
only the first two limbs relate to the validity of the directive and that the third and fourth categories 
are relevant to determining whether the directive will operate in the circumstances that have subse-
quently arisen. The third and fourth categories will be considered later: see below Part IV. 
 31 R (Burke) [2005] QB 424, 440 (Munby J). 
 32 See, eg, Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 Fam Law R 426; Re B 
[2002] 2 All ER 449. 
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Essentially capacity is dependent upon having the ability, whether or not one 
chooses to use it, to function rationally: having the ability to understand, retain, be-
lieve and evaluate (ie, process) and weigh the information which is relevant to the 
subject matter.33 
Adults are presumed to have the capacity to make a decision about medical 
treatment.34 However, particular care must be taken in assessing the adult’s capacity 
where the direction relates to refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. Because 
the consequences of such a direction are so grave, the adult’s competence must be 
correspondingly high.35 
The second requirement for a valid advance directive at common law is that it 
must have been given free from undue influence.36 In the well-known English case, 
Re T,37 the Court of Appeal held that a woman who was 34 weeks pregnant and 
who refused a blood transfusion had been subject to the undue influence of her 
mother, a Jehovah’s Witness.38 It was held that the doctors had therefore been 
justified in ignoring the woman’s refusal and administering the transfusion. 
From a legal perspective, legitimate influence must be distinguished from undue 
influence. As pointed out by Staughton LJ in Re T, an adult’s decision regarding 
treatment is frequently ‘influenced’ by others,39 such as the treating doctor, family 
and friends. However, the law regards influence as ‘undue’ only if there is ‘such a 
degree of external influence as to persuade the patient to depart from [his or] her 
own wishes’.40 When this occurs, an advance directive made by the adult will not 
be valid.41 
 
 33 R (Burke) [2005] QB 424, 440. 
 34 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 Fam Law R 408, 414–15, (Munby J); Re C [1994] 1 All ER 
819, 824 (Thorpe J); Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff), 892 (Lord 
Mustill); Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 664 (Lord Donaldson MR). 
 35 Re B [2002] 2 All ER 449, 472 (Butler-Sloss P); Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661 (Lord Donaldson 
MR). For commentary about whether the high standard required of adults in this context is consistent 
with notions of autonomy, see Joanna Manning, ‘Autonomy and the Competent Patient’s Right to 
Refuse Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment — Again’ (2002) 10 Journal of Law and Medicine 239. 
See also Malcolm Parker, ‘Judging Capacity: Paternalism and the Risk-Related Standard’ (2004) 11 
Journal of Law and Medicine 482, where he argues that there should be just the one standard for 
assessment of capacity, not a standard that alters with the gravity of the decision. He further argues 
that the latter ‘risk-related’ assessment of capacity is paternalistic in that it imports medical values 
into determination of capacity: at 489−90. 
 36 Indeed, the same principle applies if the consent to, or refusal of, treatment was not made in advance 
of treatment. 
 37 [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
 38 Ibid 664 (Lord Donaldson MR), 668 (Butler-Sloss LJ). Although the patient had been raised by her 
mother as a Jehovah’s Witness and adhered to some of their beliefs, she was not herself a Jehovah’s 
Witness: at 654 (Lord Donaldson MR).  
 39 Ibid 669. 
 40 Ibid. See also Department of Health, New South Wales, Using Advance Care Directives: New South 
Wales (2004) NSW Health 9 <http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/pubs/2004/pdf/adcare_directive.pdf>. 
 41 The authors contend that the legal concept of ‘undue influence’ when used in the medical context 
differs from that used in the contract law context. In the latter, the contract that results from undue 
influence remains valid until it is set aside by the court. In the former context, the advance directive 
could never have been regarded as being valid. For support for this approach, see Re T [1992] 4 All 
ER 649, 669 (Staughton LJ). For an overview of undue influence and how it operates in the medical 
context, see Cameron Stewart and Andrew Lynch, ‘Undue Influence, Consent and Medical Treat-
ment’ (2003) 96 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 598. 
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In contrast to the statutory regimes discussed below, there are no requirements at 
common law as to formalities, such as the need for the advance directive to be in 
writing or to be witnessed.42 Of course, these matters will still be relevant to the 
question of whether it can be demonstrated that an advance directive has been made 
and the scope of that direction.43  
B  Statutory Advance Directives 
Legislation regulating directives about future health care has been enacted in the 
Australian Capital Territory,44 the Northern Territory,45 Queensland,46 South 
Australia47 and Victoria.48 In most of these jurisdictions, the common law relating 
to advance directives continues to apply.49 This allows a two-tier system to operate. 
An adult can choose to give an advance directive which, if valid at common law, 
will govern future treatment. Alternatively, the adult may choose to comply with the 
formal requirements of the relevant legislative regime so that his or her instructions 
will be regulated by statute. As will be seen from the following discussion, the 
statutory regimes differ from the common law by prescribing formal requirements 
with which the directive must comply. This raises the question of the enforceability 
of a directive that fails to comply with those formal requirements. As common law 
directives continue to be recognised in most of these jurisdictions, it is submitted 
that a directive that does not comply with the relevant formalities will still consti-
tute a common law directive and so is likely to be binding on a health professional. 
There are generally three conditions that must be met for an advance directive 
under the various statutory regimes to be valid. The first is that the adult must have 
the requisite competence; however the test for competence varies across jurisdic-
tions. In the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, South Australia and 
Victoria, the adult must be of sound mind.50  
The position in Queensland is more complex. The Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
(Qld) defines the term ‘capacity’ in sch 3:  
‘capacity’, for a person for a matter, means the person is capable of — 
(a) understanding the nature and effect of decisions about the matter; and 
(b) freely and voluntarily making decisions about the matter; and 
(c) communicating the decisions in some way. 
Section 42 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) further details what an adult 
must be able to understand to complete an advance directive. In broad terms, the 
adult must be able to understand the nature and likely effects of each direction, and 
 
 42 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 Fam Law R 408, 417 (Munby J). 
 43 See, eg, Stewart, ‘Advanced Directives’, above n 1, 175−6. 
 44 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT). 
 45 Natural Death Act 1988 (NT). 
 46 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld). 
 47 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA). 
 48 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic). 
 49 See above n 15 and accompanying text. 
 50 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 6; Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 4(1); Consent to Medical 
Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(d). 
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the various circumstances set out in the legislation determining when the direction 
will operate.51 It is not entirely clear how this provision relates to the definition of 
‘capacity’ in sch 3 but the authors suggest that it sets out a non-exhaustive list of 
matters that an adult must be able to understand to have the requisite ‘understand-
ing’ within the sch 3 definition.52 
The second condition that must generally be met for a statutory advance directive 
to be valid is that it must not have been made as a result of undue influence. Again, 
the statutes vary in their treatment of undue influence or similar behaviour. In 
Queensland, this sort of conduct is captured in the definition of ‘capacity’, as an 
adult is not regarded as having capacity unless he or she can ‘freely and voluntarily’ 
make a decision about a matter.53 If undue influence was present when an advance 
directive was completed, the authors suggest that the adult would not have had the 
requisite capacity, and the advance directive would be void.  
Other jurisdictions deal with undue influence in a way more analogous to the 
common law. In the Australian Capital Territory, a directive is void if it is obtained 
through the use of ‘violence, threats, intimidation or [if a person] otherwise hinders 
or interferes with [the adult] … for the purpose of … obtaining’ a directive.54 This 
is broad enough to cover undue influence exerted on an adult. In Victoria, the 
witnesses who sign a refusal of treatment certificate attest to the fact that they are 
satisfied that the adult’s ‘decision is made voluntarily and without inducement or 
compulsion’.55 Although the legislation does not provide that a certificate acquired 
in this way would be void, a health professional would not receive the protection of 
the legislation if he or she relied on such a certificate knowing that the adult had not 
signed voluntarily or knowing that there had been inducement or compulsion.56  
Finally, South Australian and Northern Territory legislation is silent in relation to 
the validity of an advance directive obtained through undue influence. The South 
Australian legislation makes it an offence for a person to induce an adult to 
complete a medical power of attorney,57 but not to complete a directive. Further, the 
legislation does not provide that a directive completed because of undue influence 
is void. The Northern Territory statute is also silent about a directive completed as a 
result of undue influence. The authors contend that in South Australia and the 
Northern Territory, common law principles would apply. An advance directive 
 
 51 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 42(1). 
 52 An alternative interpretation is that s 42 is the only provision that is relevant for the purpose of 
ascertaining the capacity of an adult to complete an advance directive. However, this interpretation 
would result in the legislation containing two different tests for capacity, an outcome unlikely to 
have been intended by the legislature. 
 53 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 3. The term ‘freely and voluntarily’ is broad. It would include 
the situation where an adult completes an advance directive as a result of undue influence being 
exerted. It may also extend to the situation where an adult’s decision-making capacity is affected by 
a medical condition, for example, in the case of a psychotic mental illness, by delusional beliefs. It is 
beyond the scope of this article, however, to examine the meaning of this phrase. 
 54 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 19(1)(b). 
 55 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(b). See also s 5F which provides for the imposition of a 
penalty upon a person who has a certain interest in property affected by the patient’s death and who 
procures the execution of a certificate by deception, fraud, misstatement or undue influence. 
 56 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 9(1).  
 57 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 11(1). 
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completed in such circumstances would be invalid and a health professional who is 
aware of the undue influence would not be able to follow the directive. 
The third condition for validity of a statutory advance directive is that the rele-
vant document is completed in accordance with the formal requirements of the 
legislation. All statutes impose certain formal requirements that must be satisfied.58 
In most cases, the adult is required to sign the document.59 Witnessing requirements 
also exist in all jurisdictions. Generally the witness (or witnesses) must attest to the 
fact that the adult had the requisite capacity to make the directive.60 However, in the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, the witnesses need only 
attest to the fact that the adult signed the document.61 As mentioned earlier, in most 
Australian jurisdictions, common law advance directives will continue to be 
binding notwithstanding the introduction of a statutory regime. Therefore, an 
advance directive that does not comply with the formality requirements of the 
legislation will, in most jurisdictions, take effect as a common law advance direc-
tive.62 
In Victoria, unlike the other states, there is also a fourth requirement that must be 
met before a valid statutory advance directive can be completed. The requirement is 
that the adult must be suffering from a ‘current condition’ before he or she can 
complete a directive refusing medical treatment generally or of a specific kind for 
that condition.63 This means that an adult can only give directives in relation to a 
particular condition or conditions from which the adult is suffering at the time of 
completion and so cannot give directions in relation to conditions that he or she 
may suffer from in the future. Such a requirement is not imposed by other statutory 
regimes. 
However, all of the legislation, except for that in the Australian Capital Territory, 
contains conditions that affect when statutory advance directives refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment can operate. This is not strictly an issue of validity 
because these advance directives can be validly made before these conditions are 
met; they are just not permitted to operate.64 In broad terms, however, the legisla-
 
 58 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) ss 7, 8; Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 4; Powers of Attorney 
Act 1998 (Qld) s 44; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2); Medi-
cal Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5. 
 59 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 7(b); Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 4(1); Natural Death 
Regulations 1989 (NT) reg 2 sch; Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3)(a)(i); Consent to Medi-
cal Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2); Consent to Medical Treatment and Pallia-
tive Care Regulations 2004 (SA) sch 1; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(2) sch 1. To accom-
modate adults who are no longer physically able to sign the document, some statutes contain provi-
sions to allow someone to sign on their behalf. For example, in the Australian Capital Territory, an 
adult can give an oral directive provided it is appropriately witnessed: Medical Treatment Act 1994 
(ACT) s 8. See also Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3). 
 60 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) ss 44(4)(b), 44(5)(c); Consent to Medical Treatment and 
Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Regulations 
2004 (SA) sch 1; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1). 
 61 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 7(c)–(d), sch 1 form 1; Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 4(2); 
Natural Death Regulations 1989 (NT) reg 2 sch. 
 62 This is probably not the position in Queensland. See above n 15 regarding the inapplicability of the 
common law. 
 63 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1).  
 64 Accordingly, it is beyond the scope of this article to articulate precisely what those restrictions are. 
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tion of the Northern Territory,65 Queensland66 and South Australia67 only permits an 
advance directive refusing life-sustaining treatment to operate if the adult is 
sufficiently ill, for example, if he or she is in the terminal phase of a terminal 
illness.68 Interestingly, the model proposed in the Tasmanian Bill is a hybrid, 
providing for both an advance directive for a current condition,69 as well as a 
directive that will operate if an adult is at some stage in the future in the terminal 
phase of a terminal illness or in a persistent vegetative state.70 
I I I   EX C U S E S  F O R  NO N C O M P L I A N C E  W I T H  CO M M O N  LAW AD VA N C E  
DI R E C T I V E S 
Unlike the statutory jurisdictions which create formal excuses allowing health 
professionals not to follow advance directives in particular situations, the critical 
issue at common law is whether the refusal given in advance covers the situation 
that has arisen. If it does not, then the directive is not binding and need not be 
followed. The relatively sparse case law suggests that there are two elements to 
consider in determining whether an advance refusal will operate: whether the adult 
was provided with sufficient information to found a decision to refuse treatment 
and second, whether the adult intended his or her refusal to apply to the circum-
stances that have subsequently arisen.71 
In relation to the first element, the provision of sufficient information, Lord 
Donaldson MR in Re T suggested that a direction in an advance directive either 
consenting to treatment or refusing it may not be valid if it was not an ‘informed’ 
decision.72 This dictum has been accepted by some academics as importing a 
requirement that an adult be sufficiently informed before an advance refusal of 
treatment will operate.73  
However, the authors are of the view that the dictum of Lord Donaldson MR 
referred to above does not represent the common law. Lord Donaldson MR 
suggested that the requirement that an adult be informed in broad terms of the 
nature and effect of the treatment for consent to be valid also applies to a refusal of 
treatment. It follows from this that a failure to inform an adult in this way means 
that the refusal will not be effective. However, later in the same paragraph, Lord 
Donaldson MR narrowed his comments by saying that refusal of treatment may be 
 
 65 Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 4(1). 
 66 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2)(a). Additional restrictions on when a directive refusing 
life-sustaining medical treatment will operate also apply in Queensland: s 36(2)(b)–(c). 
 67 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(3)(a)(i). 
 68 This example is from the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) 
s 7(3)(a)(i). 
 69 Directions for Medical Treatment Bill 2005 (Tas) s 4. 
 70 Directions for Medical Treatment Bill 2005 (Tas) s 5.  
 71 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 633 (Lord Donaldson MR); HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 Fam 
Law R 408, 419–20 (Munby J). 
 72 Lord Donaldson MR said that this does not mean that a patient needs to be fully informed of all of 
the possible risks associated with the treatment as that is the realm of the law of negligence: Re T 
[1992] 4 All ER 649, 663.  
 73 See, eg, Kennedy and Grubb, above n 23, 2037; Sabine Michalowski, ‘Advance Refusals of Life-
Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of an Absolute Right’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 
958, 958. 
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vitiated if the adult was misinformed by a health professional or not given informa-
tion that has been requested, expressly or impliedly, by the adult.74 His Lordship 
falls short of imposing a blanket requirement that the health professional must 
provide information to the adult for a refusal to be valid in all cases. Further, when 
summarising his judgment, Lord Donaldson MR suggests that the only requirement 
for a refusal of treatment to be effective is that the adult be competent to make the 
decision.75 His Lordship makes no reference to a requirement that the decision be 
based on sufficient information. 
With respect to Lord Donaldson MR, a suggestion that a refusal can only be 
effective if the adult has first been given sufficient information must be incorrect. It 
is squarely in conflict with the fundamental proposition adopted and applied 
throughout the common law world that a ‘mentally competent patient has an 
absolute right to refuse to consent to medical treatment for any reason, rational or 
irrational, or for no reason at all, even where that decision may lead to his or her 
own death.’76 If the right to refuse treatment for any or no reason at all is qualified 
by a requirement to be sufficiently informed, how does that sit with the principle of 
bodily integrity that underpins the right? The cases which endorse such a right do 
not qualify it by requiring the refusal to be based on sufficient information. 
A health professional is entitled to disregard an advance directive based on the 
second element: that the adult did not intend for his or her refusal to apply in the 
relevant situation.77 In Re T, the English Court of Appeal found that the adult had 
not made the decision due to her mother’s undue influence, so it was not necessary 
to consider the issue of what she intended. Nevertheless, Lord Donaldson MR 
endorsed the statement of law that the refusal must be intended to apply in the 
particular situation,78 as did the two other judges in this case, Butler-Sloss and 
Staughton LJJ.79  
The following considers the different situations in which it might be argued that 
an adult completed an advance directive but did not intend it to apply in the 
circumstances that subsequently arose, thus permitting a health professional to 
disregard it. We have endeavoured to articulate different categories of situation but 
note that there is some overlap between them, and indeed that there may be 
situations that fall outside of these categories in which an advance directive is not 
intended to apply. 
A  Change in Circumstances 
Circumstances may change after an adult has executed an advance directive in 
such a way that the adult would not have intended the directive to apply to the 
 
 74 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 663. 
 75 Ibid 664. 
 76 Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 Fam Law R 426, 432 (Butler-Sloss LJ). See also Re B [2002] 2 
All ER 449; Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 664 (Lord Donaldson MR), 665 (Butler-Sloss LJ), 668 
(Staughton LJ); Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff), 891 (Lord Mustill); 
Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385. 
 77 Kennedy and Grubb, above n 23, 2037. 
 78 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 662–3. 
 79 Ibid 668 (Butler-Sloss LJ), 669 (Staughton LJ). 
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changed circumstances. The law has recognised that, in such a case, a health 
professional should not be required to comply with the advance refusal of treat-
ment. For the health professional to be excused, however, the change in circum-
stances must be ‘sufficiently relevant and significant to justify disregarding’ the 
advance directive.80 It will not be sufficient to demonstrate simply that circum-
stances have changed; it is necessary for those changes to be such that the adult 
would no longer have intended the directive to apply.81 
One way in which circumstances might change is in relation to an adult’s per-
sonal circumstances, such as a change in his or her values or beliefs.82 This was 
alleged to have occurred in HE v A Hospital NHS Trust.83 In that case, AE, a 
24-year-old woman had executed an advance directive refusing blood transfusions 
or other blood products. She had initially been a Muslim but was raised as a 
Jehovah’s Witness by her mother. AE’s father, HE, brought the matter before the 
court claiming that the directive no longer represented AE’s wishes. He claimed that 
AE had agreed to revert to Islam because she was marrying a man of that faith, and 
that she had implemented that decision by no longer attending Jehovah’s Witness 
meetings and services. In these circumstances, Munby J held that the directive 
cannot have survived her deliberate, implemented, decision to abandon that faith 
and revert to being a Muslim. When the entire substratum has gone, when the very 
assumption on which the advance directive was based has been destroyed by sub-
sequent events then … the refusal ceases to be effective.84 
Another change in circumstances sufficient to warrant not following an advance 
directive could arise in relation to the treatment options available in a particular 
case.85 Advances in medical science may mean that an adult suffering from what 
was previously a progressive, terminal and incurable illness could now be treated 
and cured. In such a situation, that change in circumstances may be sufficient 
justification for finding that the refusal of treatment is not intended to operate.86 
B  Uncertainty 
A health professional is justified in not following an advance directive if it is not 
expressed in clear terms, so its meaning is uncertain or ambiguous.87 For example, a 
directive may refuse the provision of ‘heroic measures’, but not elaborate on what 
sort of medical treatment that might mean.88 An uncertain direction was considered 
 
 80 Michalowski, above n 72, 969–70. 
 81 Ibid. 
 82 Ibid 970–2. 
 83 [2003] 2 Fam Law R 408. 
 84 Ibid 422. 
 85 Michalowski, above n 72, 969–70; see also ibid 419–20 (Munby J). 
 86 Michalowski, above n 72, 969–70. 
 87 Ibid 965–6; Stewart, ‘The Australian Experience of Advance Directives’, above n 15, S26. 
 88 The use of this term and the vagueness of its meaning was considered by Ian Kerridge et al, 
‘Advance Directives’ in Ian Freckelton and Kerry Petersen (eds), Controversies in Health Law 
(1999) 307. 
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in the recent case of W Healthcare NHS Trust v H,89 which dealt with advance 
statements made many years earlier by KH, a 59-year-old woman who was suffer-
ing from multiple sclerosis. KH had made statements about medical treatment that 
she did not want, including one statement refusing life support machines90 and 
other statements refusing treatment if she could not continue with a ‘reasonable 
quality of life’.91 
KH was being provided with artificial nutrition and hydration through a percuta-
neous endoscopic gastrostomy (‘PEG’) tube, which became dislodged. In consider-
ing whether the tube should be reinserted, the issue was whether she had given an 
advance directive refusing that form of treatment. None of KH’s statements had 
specifically addressed the issue of artificial nutrition and hydration. The court 
accepted that some of her statements may have been sufficient to refuse other 
medical treatment, for example, her desire not to be kept alive on ‘life support 
machines’.92 However, the other remaining general statements refusing treatment 
based on quality of life considerations were insufficiently clear to amount to an 
advance directive and the court held that she had not refused the artificial nutrition 
and hydration.93 
It is important to distinguish uncertainty as to the meaning of an advance direc-
tive from uncertainty in relation to matters of proof. Issues of proof can relate to a 
range of matters including, for example, doubt about whether the adult had suffi-
cient capacity to complete the advance directive. Uncertainty in this latter sense is 
discussed further in Part VI of the article. 
C  Incorrect Information or Assumptions 
A refusal contained in an advance directive that is based on incorrect information 
or an incorrect assumption may mean that an adult would not have intended that the 
refusal would apply in the circumstances that have arisen. This differs from the 
situation where circumstances change because the incorrect information or assump-
tion was present when the refusal was first made. 
An example arose in Re T,94 where the adult’s advance refusal of blood products 
was based on the erroneous assumption that non-blood products would be a 
satisfactory alternative should treatment be necessary at a later stage.95 Although it 
was unnecessary to decide this issue since the English Court of Appeal had based 
its decision on other grounds, both Lord Donaldson MR and Butler-Sloss LJ 
indicated that a refusal based on an incorrect assumption would not be operative.96  
 
 89 [2005] 1 WLR 834. Cf Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 Fam Law R 129 where no 
issue of uncertainty arose, no doubt aided by the fact that the statements were given shortly before 
and in contemplation of the specific treatment that was being refused. 
 90 W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2005] 1 WLR 834, 836 (Brooke LJ). 
 91 Ibid 839 (Brooke LJ). 
 92 Ibid. 
 93 Ibid 840 (Brooke LJ). 
 94 [1992] 4 All ER 649. 
 95 Ibid 655 (Lord Donaldson MR). 
 96 Ibid 663 (Lord Donaldson MR), 668 (Butler-Sloss LJ). 
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D  No Decision Made 
This category involves situations where an advance directive has been made but 
is not intended to apply to a particular set of circumstances because it is found that 
the directive does not make a decision in relation to those circumstances. There is 
some overlap with earlier categories but it is distinguished from the situation where 
a directive was based on incorrect information or an incorrect assumption and 
where a change of circumstances arose. Those categories deal with instances where 
a decision has been made, but that decision should not be acted upon. The uncer-
tainty category is also distinguished because, in that case, there is doubt about what 
decision has been made. 
A commonly cited example of where an advance directive had been made but is 
construed as not involving a decision in relation to the circumstances that arose is 
the American case of Werth v Taylor.97 In that case, the court held that a refusal of 
blood transfusions was not effective to cover the situation where blood became 
necessary to save a pregnant woman’s life. This is despite the fact that documents 
refusing blood transfusions were signed two months prior to the woman’s admis-
sion, and that the woman made verbal statements to the same effect at the time of 
the admission. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that because the directive was 
given at a time when the woman’s life was not in danger, she was not regarded as 
having made a decision to refuse blood transfusions in the subsequent life-
threatening situation that arose.98 
IV  EX C U S E S  F O R  NO N C O M P L I A N C E  W I T H  STAT U TO RY AD VA N C E  
DI R E C T I V E S 
As was the situation at common law, there are a number of excuses under statute 
upon which health professionals may rely in not following a valid advance direc-
tive. This Part of the article examines the excuses that are created by the various 
statutes that operate in Australia. 
A  Change in Circumstances 
The situation where circumstances change after an advance directive is made, but 
before a medical situation arises, was considered earlier in the context of common 
law directives.99 The changes in circumstance considered above included a change 
in the personal situation of the adult (for example in relation to religious faith) or a 
change due to advances in medical science. Another situation that might be re-
garded as falling within the ‘change of circumstances’ category is where an adult 
changes his or her mind about an advance directive that he or she has previously 
given, but does not actually revoke it. Because some statutes specifically address 
that situation, it is considered as a separate category of excuse in this Part. 
 
 97 475 NW 2d 426 (Mich Ct App, 1991). 
 98 Ibid 430 (Neef PJ). 
 99 See above Part III(A). 
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Queensland legislation largely reflects the common law. Section 103(1) of the 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) specifies that a health professional does not 
incur any liability for failing to follow a directive if he or she has  
reasonable grounds to believe that … circumstances, including advances in medi-
cal science, have changed to the extent that the terms of the direction are inappro-
priate. 
This means that if, for example, an adult’s religious beliefs change (as in HE v A 
Hospital NHS Trust100) so that the adult would no longer consider him or herself 
bound by the directive, a health professional is excused from not following it. 
The same result would follow if a directive was based on a particular state of 
medical science, but significant developments had been made by the time a decision 
was needed about the appropriate medical treatment. Indeed, the provision specifi-
cally refers to ‘advances in medical science’.101 For example, an adult who is 
diagnosed with dementia may complete a directive that he or she does not want to 
receive life-sustaining medical treatment under any circumstances. This directive 
may have been made because there was no treatment for dementia and the adult did 
not want to experience a slow decline in mental capacity until death resulted. If 
there were an advance in medical science so that dementia could be treated and 
possibly reversed, this may be sufficient under the Queensland statute to excuse a 
health professional for not complying with the adult’s directive. 
Other statutory jurisdictions do not contain a specific provision excusing non-
compliance with an advance directive on the general ground of a change in circum-
stances. Victoria has a limited provision that focuses on a change in circumstances 
relating to an adult’s medical condition.102 That provision provides that a directive 
will cease to apply ‘if the medical condition of the person has changed to such an 
extent that the condition in relation to which the [advance directive] was given is no 
longer current.’103 Although framed in terms of a limit on the operation of advance 
directives (rather than it ceasing to apply), provisions in the South Australian and 
Northern Territory legislation have a similar effect. As outlined in Part II above, an 
advance directive in those jurisdictions will only operate if the adult is suffering 
from a particular medical condition. If the adult’s circumstances change so that he 
or she no longer suffers from that condition, the advance directive will no longer 
operate.104 The situation is different in the Australian Capital Territory as its 
legislation does not contain a similar provision, nor otherwise deals with the 
situation where circumstances change.  
 
100 [2003] 2 Fam Law R 408.  
101 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
102 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 7(3).  
103 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 7(3).  
104 Under legislation in South Australia and the Northern Territory, a health professional is not 
authorised to comply with an advance directive unless the adult is in the terminal phase of a terminal 
illness or in a persistent vegetative state (Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 
(SA) s 4(1)), or is suffering from a terminal illness (Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 7(3)(a)(1)). 
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B  Intention to Revoke Advance Directive 
Although it is clear that a health professional should not rely upon an advance 
directive that has been validly revoked, what of the situation where an adult may 
have changed his or her mind but has failed to actually revoke the directive? 
Statutes in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and South 
Australia deal specifically with this kind of situation. A health professional must not 
comply with an advance directive if he or she believes that the adult intended to 
revoke that directive (the Northern Territory105 and South Australia106) or if the 
health professional believes on reasonable grounds that the adult has changed his or 
her mind since making the direction (Australian Capital Territory107). 
The legislation in Queensland does not contain an equivalent provision. However, 
the excuse relating to a change in circumstances discussed above may be broad 
enough to excuse a health professional from not following a directive if there is 
evidence that an adult intended to revoke the directive but had not yet done so.108  
C  Uncertainty 
The possibility of an advance directive being uncertain is considered specifically 
only in the Queensland legislation, where it excuses a health professional from 
complying with a directive if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
direction is uncertain.109 However, before a health professional can be regarded as 
having reasonable grounds for reaching such a conclusion, he or she must have 
consulted any of the attorneys who have been appointed under the advance direc-
tive about the direction.110  
D  Contrary to Good Medical Practice 
Queensland is also the only jurisdiction in which a health professional is excused 
from following a valid advance directive for reasons grounded in good medical 
practice. The Act defines ‘good medical practice’ in sch 2: 
Good medical practice is good medical practice for the medical profession in Aus-
tralia having regard to — 
(a) the recognised medical standards, practices and procedures of the medi-
cal profession in Australia; and 
 
105 Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 4(3)(a). 
106 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(3)(b). 
107 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 12(b). 
108 The Victorian Act does not specifically address the situation of an intended revocation. However, it 
does permit the cancellation of an advance directive with a minimum of formality requiring only that 
the adult ‘clearly express’ or ‘indicate’ to a health professional (or another person) their decision to 
cancel the certificate: Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) ss 7(1), 7(2). 
109 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
110 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). It is interesting to note that the legislation does not 
require a health professional to consult with an attorney for health matters who has been appointed 
by the adult under an enduring power of attorney, as opposed to an advance directive: s 103(3).  
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(b) the recognised ethical standards of the medical profession in Austra-
lia.111 
Notions of good medical practice are relevant to the binding nature of an advance 
directive under the legislative regime in Queensland. First, an advance directive to 
withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration cannot operate unless the 
commencement or continuation of that measure would be inconsistent with good 
medical practice.112 This requirement does not apply to any of the other life-
sustaining medical treatment such as artificial ventilation, cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation or the provision of antibiotics that are necessary to prolong an adult’s 
life. By way of comparison, compliance with good medical practice is not relevant 
to whether or not an advance directive will operate in any of the other statutory 
regimes.113 
Second, even if the advance directive to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
medical treatment is one that can operate,114 the Queensland legislation contains a 
provision that excuses a health professional who chooses not to follow it. Having 
much wider implications, a health professional does not incur any liability for 
failing to follow a directive if he or she has ‘reasonable grounds to believe that a 
direction in an [advance directive] is … inconsistent with good medical practice’.115 
Professional standards of medical practice are also relevant to a statutory excuse 
under the South Australian legislation. Section 16 of the Consent to Medical 
Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) exempts a health professional from 
liability for an act or omission done or made: 
(a) with the consent of the patient or the patient’s representative … ; and 
(b) in good faith and without negligence; and 
(c) in accordance with proper professional standards of medical practice; and 
(d) in order to preserve or improve the quality of life. 
Although two aspects of this excuse are grounded in compliance with proper 
professional standards of medical practice, the authors contend that a health 
professional who relied on a breach of these standards to justify not complying with 
an advance refusal of treatment would not be able to seek the protection of the 
excuse. Consent has not been obtained as required by s 16(a). Indeed, the adult has 
given an express refusal to treatment.116 
 
111 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 2 s 5B. See also Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 
(Qld) sch 2 s 5B. 
112 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36(2)(b). 
113 In all of the jurisdictions (except the Australian Capital Territory), there are restrictions on when an 
advance directive to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment can operate: see above Part II(B). How-
ever, only in Queensland do these restrictions include compliance of the directive with good medical 
practice. 
114 That is, the advance directive complies with all of the requirements for validity, and is one that 
satisfies the restrictions in Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36 about when such a directive can 
operate. 
115 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
116 Cf Attorney-General and Minister for Health, above n 13, 36, which implies that health professionals 
would be excused in such circumstances. 
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The statutory regimes in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory 
and Victoria do not contain excuses for health professionals who do not comply 
with an advance directive on the basis of good medical practice. 
V  A CO M PA R AT I V E  AN A LY S I S  O F  STAT U TO RY A N D  CO M M O N  LAW 
EX C U S E S 
The right to self-determination or autonomy is a fundamental part of health law117 
and underpins the obligation on a health professional to obtain consent from a 
patient before providing medical treatment.118 It is this right that permits a compe-
tent adult to make his or her own decisions about medical care and refuse to accept 
medical treatment.119 This right has been recognised in the various Australian 
jurisdictions in relation to advance directives, both at common law and under 
statute, as the law allows adults, to a greater or lesser extent, to refuse treatment in 
advance. 
The other major interest in this area, the state’s interest in the protection of life, is 
also a fundamental principle of the law.120 In cases of conflict, such as where an 
adult wishes to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, the courts have consistently 
found that the right to self-determination is paramount and so will prevail over the 
sanctity of life.121 However, given the gravity of the outcome, directives that refuse 
life-sustaining medical treatment are closely scrutinised by courts122 and any doubt 
will be resolved in favour of the preservation of life.123 The interest of the state in 
preserving life can also be seen in both common law and under statute in the 
excuses that are available to a health professional who does not follow an advance 
directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. 
This Part has two goals. First, to compare each of the excuses at common law and 
under the various statutes that are available to a health professional who does not 
follow an advance directive. Second, to examine each excuse in some detail and 
consider whether it is appropriate for the law to recognise an exception to the 
 
117 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, 72–3 (Lord Goff) (‘Re F’); Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff); Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 652–3 (Lord Donaldson MR). 
See also discussion about the history of development of autonomy as a central idea in medical law in 
Derek Morgan and Kenneth Veitch, ‘Being Ms B: B, Autonomy and the Nature of Legal Regulation’ 
(2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 107.  
118 See, eg, Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, 73 (Lord Goff) where reference was made to each person’s body being 
inviolate; Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 664–5 (Butler-Sloss LJ) where the right to determine what 
happens with one’s body was recognised; Re B [2002] 2 All ER 449, 472 (Butler-Sloss P); Marion’s 
Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 232–3 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) where bodily 
inviolability was acknowledged, and it was noted that consent renders medical treatment lawful 
where it would otherwise be assault. 
119 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 652–3 (Lord Donaldson MR).  
120 Ibid 661 (Lord Donaldson MR); Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 863 (Lord Goff), 889 
(Lord Mustill). 
121 See, eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864 (Lord Goff), 891 (Lord Mustill); Re B 
[2002] 2 All ER 449, 457 (Butler-Sloss P); Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 664 (Lord Donaldson MR), 
665 (Butler-Sloss LJ), 668 (Staughton LJ). 
121 See, eg, Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649; Re B [2002] 2 All ER 449, 458–9 (Butler-Sloss P). See also 
Manning, above n 34, 240, referring to criticism of courts paying ‘lip service to the right to refuse 
life-saving treatment’ while behaving paternalistically. 
123 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661 (Lord Donaldson MR). Cf Michalowski, above n 72, 959–63.  
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general rule that advance directives are binding and should be followed. Pivotal to 
this goal of assessing the appropriateness of an excuse is the tension between the 
right of the individual to self-determination or autonomy, and the interest of the 
state in protecting the sanctity of life. In short, advance directives are regarded as an 
expression of an individual’s autonomy, whereas the excuses that permit noncom-
pliance with a directive often reflect the state’s interest in the sanctity of life. An 
examination of how this tension should be resolved will be considered below as 
part of determining whether an excuse is appropriate. 
To facilitate a preliminary comparison, the authors have compiled a table outlin-
ing the excuses discussed to date and the extent to which each of them is available 
in the various jurisdictions.124 One point that should be made is that these tables 
only include those jurisdictions with an excuse that is specifically relevant. A health 
professional in a jurisdiction that does not contain such an excuse may still be 
protected, however, as another more general excuse may apply. 
A  Change in Circumstances 
As explored in Part III(A) a change in an adult’s personal circumstances may 
mean that the advance directive need not be followed. On the whole, a much 
narrower approach has been taken in the statutory jurisdictions than at common law 
in relation to the issue of a change of circumstances. Only the Queensland legisla-
tion expressly excuses a health professional for not following an advance directive 
if there is a change in the circumstances of the adult. The provision would obvi-
ously include a change in an adult’s personal circumstances and it also specifically 
refers to a change in circumstances arising out of advances in medical science.125 
The Australian Capital Territory’s legislation does not address the issue of change 
of circumstances. Provisions in the Northern Territory, South Australian and 
Victorian legislation do so only in a limited way, providing that an advance 
directive will cease to apply or will not operate if the medical condition of the adult 
has changed.126  
It seems that the excuse in Queensland is broader than the common law as it 
refers to a health professional who has ‘reasonable grounds to believe … that 
circumstances … have changed to the extent that the terms of the direction are 
inappropriate.’127 At common law, the test that is applied is whether the change in 
circumstances is such that the adult would not have intended his or her refusal to 
apply to the circumstances that have arisen.128 The wording of the Queensland 
provision, however, with its reference to a health professional’s belief (on reason-
able grounds) that the direction is inappropriate seems to shift the focus of the 
enquiry away from the adult and towards the health professional.  
 
124 See below Part VIII. 
125 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
126 See the summation of the jurisdictional variations with respect to change in circumstances in Table 1: 
see below Part VIII.  
127 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
128 Michalowski, above n 72, 970; see also Derek Morgan, ‘Odysseus and the Binding Directive: Only a 
Cautionary Tale?’ (1994) 14 Legal Studies 411, 411–32. 
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How such a provision might operate can be illustrated by the example of a 
25-year-old woman who makes an advance directive refusing life-sustaining 
medical treatment. Subsequent to the completion of the directive, the woman has a 
child. The Queensland provision is wide enough to allow a health professional not 
to follow the advance directive on the basis that, since the adult now has the 
responsibility for a young child, it is no longer ‘appropriate’ to comply with the 
directive. The authors contend that the excuse as drafted in Queensland is too wide 
as it enables an unjustifiable departure from an adult’s directive. The common law 
position is to be preferred as it strikes a more sensible balance between principles of 
autonomy and the sanctity of life. 
B  Intention to Revoke Advance Directive 
If an advance directive has been revoked, it is clear that a health professional 
should not rely upon it. The situation is more complex if a health professional 
believes that the adult intended to revoke the advance directive, yet did not do so by 
the time a decision is needed to be made about treatment. As noted above, legisla-
tion in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and South Australia 
specifically deal with this kind of situation.129  
Queensland, Victoria and those jurisdictions governed by the common law do not 
have an excuse that specifically relates to such an intention. However, there is some 
overlap between this excuse and that relating to a change in circumstances dis-
cussed above, particularly where such a change relates to an adult’s personal 
circumstances. Situations may arise where evidence of an intention to revoke an 
advance directive will also reveal a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant 
not following the directive. To further develop the case study used above, an adult 
may have made an advance directive before having children but, after becoming a 
parent, discussed with people that he or she has had a change of heart about the 
directions given. In such a case, a health professional would be entitled not to 
follow the directive and rely on the excuse of an intention to revoke a directive or 
on the excuse of a change in circumstances, depending on the jurisdiction in which 
the situation arose. This overlap of excuses is reflected by the fact that all Austra-
lian jurisdictions except for Victoria130 have enshrined either one or the other in 
legislation.  
Apart from the reservations already expressed in relation to the discretion given 
to health professionals by Queensland’s change of circumstances excuse, the 
authors believe that the excuse of an intention to revoke the directive (or the 
application of the change in circumstances excuse in those situations) is appropri-
ate. The excuse strikes a proper balance between the need to follow an adult’s 
expressed directions while still ensuring that treatment is not withheld or withdrawn 
inappropriately. If an adult has indicated his or her intention to alter the advance 
directive but, at the relevant time, has yet to do so, the health professional should 
not comply with that directive and is excused for doing so. 
 
129 See above nn 104–6 and accompanying text. 
130 Note though that the Victorian legislation contains a more limited excuse for a health professional 
not following an advance directive: Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) ss 7(1), 7(2). 
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C  Uncertainty 
Uncertainty as to the meaning of a directive can arise when the language it uses is 
vague or imprecise.131 One example discussed above is a directive that refuses the 
provision of ‘heroic measures’.132 Another example arose in the recent case of W 
Healthcare NHS Trust v H133 which involved statements that referred to a ‘reason-
able quality of life’.134 In Queensland and those jurisdictions governed by the 
common law, health professionals are excused for not following an advance 
directive when its meaning is uncertain. Again, a distinction is made here between 
uncertainty as to the meaning of an advance directive and uncertainty in relation to 
matters of proof. Uncertainty as to whether a change in circumstances is sufficient 
to disregard a directive, whether there was an intention to revoke it, or whether the 
adult had sufficient capacity to execute the advance health directive, for example, 
falls into the latter category and is considered further in Part VI below.  
The provision contained in the Queensland legislation excuses a health profes-
sional if he or she ‘has reasonable grounds to believe that a direction in an [advance 
directive] is uncertain’.135 The legislation does not define ‘uncertainty’. However, 
the relevant section purports to provide further assistance in determining whether a 
directive is uncertain and states:  
if an attorney is appointed under the [advance directive], the [health professional] 
has reasonable grounds to believe that a direction in the [advance directive] is un-
certain only if, among other things, the [health professional] has consulted the at-
torney about the direction.136 
This requirement to consult an attorney raises three issues. The first is that the 
provision suggests that an attorney may be able to clarify a directive so that it is no 
longer regarded as uncertain. In the case of a directive that refers to ‘heroic 
measures’, this may mean that if an attorney was capable of providing enough 
information to explain what the adult meant, the directive would no longer be 
uncertain. This begs the question as to how much clarification an attorney is able to 
provide. It is obviously a question of degree, but a touchstone to consider is 
whether the attorney is simply explaining or clarifying an adult’s decision or 
whether the attorney is making their own decision, albeit probably based on what 
he or she thinks the adult would have wanted. Certainly the more uncertain a 
directive is, the more likely it is that an attorney is making the decision themselves. 
 
131 Kerridge et al, above n 87, 307, where they also refer to a large study conducted in the United States 
by J M Teno et al, which revealed that only 22 of 688 advance directives for terminally ill patients 
provided sufficient guidance to inform medical care: J M Teno et al, ‘Do Advance Directives Provide 
Instructions that Direct Care’ (1997) 45 Journal of the American Geriatric Society 508. See also 
Margaret Brown, ‘The Law and Practice Associated with Advance Directives in Canada and Austra-
lia: Similarities, Differences and Debates’ (2003) 11 Journal of Law and Medicine 59, 72 where she 
suggests that advance directives are difficult to ‘write, interpret and implement’ and that there is no 
perfect advance directive form which ‘will cover all contingencies’. See further Paul Biegler et al, 
‘Determining the Validity of Advance Directives’ (2000) 172 Medical Journal of Australia 545. 
132 See above n 88 and accompanying text. 
133 [2005] 1 WLR 834.  
134 Ibid 839 (Brooke LJ). See also the example discussed by Michalowski, above n 72, 966.  
135 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
136 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(3). 
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The second issue raised by the requirement to consult an attorney is that it is just 
that — a mere requirement to consult. This means that while a health professional 
must invite an attorney to clarify or explain the directive, there is no obligation to 
accept that clarification or explanation and to comply with the directive. For this 
reason, the requirement to consult is probably more effective in cases where those 
involved in the decision want to follow the advance directive than it is in cases of 
disagreement.  
The third issue is that the requirement to consult an attorney is only imposed 
when an attorney is appointed under an advance directive, rather than under an 
enduring power of attorney. Perhaps the rationale for this is that it is likely that an 
attorney appointed under that document, rather than another enduring document, 
would be better able to clarify the intentions of the adult who made it. 
Despite these issues, it is suggested that other statutory jurisdictions should enact 
an excuse that permits a health professional to disregard an uncertain advance 
directive. These documents often predict an uncertain future, so there is a real 
danger that a directive given now will later be ambiguous.137 Having said this, there 
is less scope for uncertainty arising in Victoria where an advance directive can only 
be given in relation to a medical condition from which the adult is currently 
suffering.138 Given that the legislation further requires the adult to be informed 
about the nature of the condition to an extent that is sufficient to make a decision 
about the treatment that he or she wishes to refuse,139 it is less likely that an 
advance directive made in Victoria would be uncertain. Nevertheless, that possibil-
ity still remains, as it does in the other statutory jurisdictions. 
It may be that even without a specific excuse, an uncertain advance directive need 
not be followed in those statutory jurisdictions. An advance directive can only give 
directions if they are clear and capable of determining an adult’s medical treatment. 
Simply, it may be that an uncertain advance directive is not capable of dictating 
what medical treatment an adult does or does not receive and so will not bind a 
health professional, even where there is no specific excuse. However, the inclusion 
of such a provision in legislation would add greater certainty and would enable the 
prescription of certain steps before a directive can be found to be uncertain.  
The authors suggest that the Queensland approach might provide a useful model 
for the other statutory jurisdictions. A positive obligation should be imposed on a 
health professional to make enquiries from those close to the adult if the meaning of 
an advance directive is uncertain or ambiguous. If such consultation is capable of 
providing certainty, then the advance directive should be followed. If certainty is 
not achieved, the health professionals should not comply with the directive.140 Such 
an approach represents an appropriate balance between autonomy — in that a 
 
137 Michalowski, above n 72, 965–6. 
138 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(a). 
139 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(c). 
140 It is interesting to consider the wording of Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103. If a health 
provider considers the direction to be uncertain (having consulted as directed by the provision), he or 
she is excused from following the direction. The legislation does not prohibit the health professional 
from so doing. Cf the approach in the Australian Capital Territory: Medical Treatment Act 1994 
(ACT) s 12(a). 
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directive is followed where possible — and the sanctity of life principle which is 
respected by not complying with an uncertain or ambiguous advance refusal of life-
sustaining medical treatment. 
D  Incorrect Information or Assumption 
At common law, an advance directive which is based on incorrect information or 
an incorrect assumption will not operate if the adult would not have intended that 
the refusal apply in the circumstances that have arisen.141  
None of the statutes contain an equivalent provision regarding a directive being 
based on incorrect information or an incorrect assumption. However, in two of the 
statutory jurisdictions, there are requirements to provide information that will 
reduce the chance of an advance directive being based on flawed material. In 
Victoria, an advance directive can only be made in relation to a condition from 
which the adult is suffering,142 and the adult must be informed about the nature of 
the condition.143 In the Australian Capital Territory, the legislation actually imposes 
an obligation on the health professional to advise the adult about his or her illness, 
alternative forms of treatment, the consequences of the treatment and the conse-
quences of remaining untreated.144 The other statutory jurisdictions do not impose a 
requirement to be informed of these matters.145  
The Queensland legislation does not create an excuse or impose a requirement to 
specifically inform an adult completing an advance directive, but a health profes-
sional is entitled not to follow an advance directive if he or she has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a direction in it is inconsistent with good medical prac-
tice.146 It would be inconsistent with good medical practice to rely on an advance 
refusal of treatment that would result in the death of an adult where that advance 
refusal was based on incorrect information or an incorrect assumption of sufficient 
importance. 
The authors suggest that all statutory jurisdictions should have an excuse that 
permits noncompliance with an advance directive based on incorrect information or 
an incorrect assumption. However, such an excuse should require that the incorrect 
information or assumption be so significant that the adult would not have intended 
the directive to operate in the circumstances that in fact existed. Although the right 
to self-determination or autonomy should generally take priority, in circumstances 
where that decision is based on flawed material, it is appropriate for the principle of 
 
141 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649. Although it was unnecessary to decide this issue on the facts, both Lord 
Donaldson MR and Butler-Sloss LJ endorsed this statement of law: at 663 (Lord Donaldson MR), 
668 (Butler-Sloss LJ). 
142 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(a). 
143 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(c). 
144 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 11(1). 
145 There is a requirement in the Queensland legislation for a doctor to certify that the adult completing 
the advance directive has sufficient capacity: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(6). However, 
there is no legal requirement for the doctor to discuss the directions being given. Notwithstanding 
the lack of legal requirement for the adult to discuss the advance directive with the doctor, the pre-
scribed advance directive form advises the adult in a number of locations that such a discussion is 
highly desirable. 
146 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103. 
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sanctity of life to prevail. If such an excuse is not enacted, a minimum requirement 
should be the imposition of a duty to provide information, as required in the 
Australian Capital Territory. 
E  No Decision Made 
One situation where the common law has recognised that an advance directive is 
not intended to apply is where the directive does not make a decision in relation to 
the circumstances that have arisen. Often this will be a matter of interpretation by 
the courts as to what decision a directive has actually made.147  
The statutory jurisdictions do not have a specific excuse that relates to the scope 
of a decision so the opportunity for a court to engage in an interpretive exercise is 
probably more limited. However, an argument advanced earlier in relation to 
uncertainty would also apply here.148 An advance directive is only effective to 
guide decision-making if it actually makes a decision. A statutory directive that 
does not make the decision that arises in the circumstances will therefore not be 
binding.  
The authors do not have reservations about the existence of this excuse, because a 
directive that has not made a decision about treatment should clearly not be 
followed. However, there are concerns about how advance directives may be 
interpreted to find that no decision has been made so that the directive need not be 
followed. These concerns relate to issues of proof and are discussed below.149 
F  Contrary to Good Medical Practice 
Individuals have different views about what quality of life is acceptable to them 
and what medical treatment they are prepared to accept or endure. Advance 
directives allow an adult to give directions about withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining medical treatment in particular circumstances, thus allowing the adult to 
make a choice about when he or she wants to refuse treatment and be permitted to 
die. At common law, a health professional cannot refuse to follow an advance 
directive because it is contrary to conventional notions of what is in the medical 
best interests of the adult. If a valid advance directive applies to the relevant 
circumstances that have arisen, then it must be followed. This is also the law in all 
but one of the statutory jurisdictions. 
The position in Queensland is different. The legislation creates a very broad 
excuse which permits a health professional not to follow an advance directive if he 
or she has ‘reasonable grounds to believe that a direction in an [advance directive] 
is … inconsistent with good medical practice.’150 This is in stark contrast to all 
other jurisdictions where there is no ability to override an advance directive based 
 
147 The example discussed above in Part III(D) was the American case of Werth v Taylor, 475 NW 2d 
426 (Mich Ct App, 1991). 
148 See above Part III(D). 
149 See below Part VI. 
150 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
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on a medical assessment of the appropriateness of the decision.151 The Queensland 
provision is interesting though because the excuse is one that permits a health 
professional some discretion. It does not prohibit following an advance directive 
that is inconsistent with good medical practice; it simply excuses from liability a 
health professional who chooses to ignore it.152  
The significance of the excuse is clear when it is examined in light of the English 
decision of Re B.153 In that case, a 41-year-old tetraplegic woman, Ms B, wished to 
refuse artificial ventilation. Her medical team disagreed and wanted her to try other 
treatment options. They refused to follow her direction. Butler-Sloss P found that 
the refusal to follow the directions of Ms B was unlawful and that treatment should 
be stopped.154 Assume for the moment that Ms B had given those directions which 
were found to be binding, but subsequently lost capacity. At common law, those 
directions remain binding, despite contrary views as to what is medically appropri-
ate. However, if Ms B had given those directions in a valid and operative advance 
directive executed in accordance with the legislation in Queensland,155 a different 
result could occur. A health professional could lawfully refuse to follow those 
directions by relying on Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103.  
An excuse based on good medical practice seriously weakens the essence of 
advance directives: the ability of an adult to choose the treatment that he or she 
wishes to refuse, even if others may disagree. It also undermines the primacy that 
the common law has given to the right to self-determination or autonomy. The 
practical effect of the excuse is that an adult cannot be confident that his or her 
advance directive will be followed if it is not considered good medical practice for 
treatment to be withheld or withdrawn. The authors are of the view that the excuse 
should be repealed and that, in this context, the common law position reflects a 
more appropriate balance between the right to self-determination or autonomy, and 
the sanctity of life. 
VI   JU D I C I A L AP P R O A C H E S  TO  PR O O F   
This Part considers another factor which is influential in whether or not an adult’s 
advance directive is followed: the degree of proof that is required by a court and/or 
a health professional in relation to determining the validity of the directive and 
whether it operates in a particular case. How sure does a court or health profes-
sional have to be before following an advance directive? How are issues of uncer-
tainty resolved? Will a mere assertion that reasons exist for an advance directive not 
to be followed create sufficient doubt? These questions are answered by the 
interrelation of the right to self-determination or autonomy, and the principle of the 
sanctity of life. As already considered in this article, the law has consistently 
 
151 Although most statutory jurisdictions do have limits on the conditions in which advance directives to 
refuse medical treatment can operate: see above Part II(B). 
152 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(2). 
153 [2002] 2 All ER 449. 
154 Ibid 450–1. 
155 That is, if the directive complied with the validity requirements and satisfied the requirements of 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 36. 
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recognised that an adult’s right to self-determination allows him or her to refuse 
life-sustaining medical treatment, and that the right prevails over any state interest 
in the preservation of life. Notwithstanding the paramountcy of the right to self-
determination, however, directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment are 
closely scrutinised by courts. Any doubt about the validity of the directive or 
whether it was intended to apply to a particular situation is likely to be resolved in 
favour of the preservation of life. 
There has been criticism of the way that the courts have approached this exercise. 
Sabine Michalowski claims that there is a strong bias in favour of the preservation 
of life that influences how decisions are made.156 She suggests that enquiries as to 
questions of fact, such as whether an advance directive exists and whether it applies 
in the relevant circumstances, should be approached in a disinterested way. If there 
is doubt after such an enquiry, then the principle of sanctity of life requires that the 
directive not be followed. However, she argues that the bias in favour of life is 
influencing those findings of fact so that doubt is found more readily than should be 
the case.157 
A similar point is made by Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb in commenting on 
the common law requirement that ‘the patient intend his or her refusal to apply to 
the circumstances which subsequently arise.’158 They refer to it as a ‘Trojan Horse’ 
because of its ability to ‘undermine the law’s apparent commitment to the patient’s 
right of self-determination’.159 Kennedy and Grubb suggest that the courts scruti-
nise advance directives so closely, particularly regarding whether the situation that 
arose was the one precisely contemplated by the adult, that it may be very difficult 
for an adult successfully to refuse treatment in advance.160  
The authors of this article share those concerns. While it is accepted that in cases 
of doubt, the sanctity of life should prevail, caution is needed to ensure that a bias 
in favour of life does not in itself generate those doubts. For these reasons, it is 
suggested that a more robust approach, such as the one taken in Malette v Shul-
man,161 should be preferred. In that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the 
provision of a blood transfusion contrary to a woman’s advance refusal contained 
on a card in her purse was unlawful. The doctor argued that there was doubt that the 
card represented the woman’s views; for example, it was unknown whether she was 
still a Jehovah’s Witness, whether she still knew the card was in her purse or 
whether she had been sufficiently informed of the nature and effect of her deci-
sion.162 The Court noted the possibility of these events but concluded that the 
doctor’s doubts as to these matters were ‘not rationally founded on the evidence 
before him.’163 The authors endorse such an approach. The primacy of the sanctity 
of life in cases of uncertainty does not warrant accepting whatever doubts are 
 
156 Michalowski, above n 72. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Kennedy and Grubb, above n 23, 2037. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid 2037–8. 
161 (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321. 
162 Ibid 331–2 (Robins JA). 
163 Ibid 326, 337 (Robins JA). 
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asserted, without scrutiny. Suggestions of doubt or uncertainty should be tested, and 
only accepted if they are ‘rationally founded on the evidence’.  
So far the discussion of issues of proof has focused on the common law jurisdic-
tions, but similar questions arise in relation to advance directives completed under 
statutory regimes. In the Australian Capital Territory, a health professional may not 
act on an advance refusal unless he or she believes on reasonable grounds that the 
adult understood the information about the illness and treatment options and was 
able to assess it,164 and that the direction complies with the legislation.165 The 
Northern Territory legislation also excuses a health professional from complying 
with a directive if there is uncertainty about the adult’s capacity at the time of 
completing the directive.166 Queensland’s legislation contains a specific excuse 
dealing with uncertainty but that only relates to uncertainty about a direction in an 
advance directive.167 
Although issues of proof still arise under the statutory regimes, it is suggested 
that a court would be less likely to interfere with an advance refusal given under the 
statutory regimes than one made at common law. Although only speculation, this 
might be the case for three reasons. First, the courts may be more likely to interfere 
with a common law directive, as the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment 
at common law is one that was judicially created.168 It may be that there would be 
more reluctance to read down a document authorised by statute.  
Second, a court may feel that an advance directive given under a statutory regime 
is more reliable. As discussed above, there are varying requirements as to witness-
ing and other formalities which may mean that the completed document reflects a 
more considered approach.169  
Third, determining whether a common law directive should be followed or not 
generally turns on whether the person intended his or her refusal to apply to the 
circumstances that have actually arisen.170 The determination of such a question 
calls for the interpretation of an adult’s wishes and so provides greater scope for 
interference. This can be contrasted with the more specific excuses under the 
statutory regimes which, with the exception of Queensland, create less room for 
interpretation. Having said that, it may be that in future the courts will take an 
active role in interpreting statutory advance directives, as they have with those at 
common law. Indeed, it may be that any differences may arise simply because the 
 
164 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 11(2).  
165 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 12(a). 
166 It is the duty of the health professional to comply with the direction unless there is ‘reasonable 
ground to believe that’, among other things, the adult ‘was not, at the time of making the direction, 
capable of understanding the nature and consequences of the direction’: Natural Death Act 1988 
(NT) s 4(3)(b). 
167 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). See above nn Error! Bookmark not defined.–4 and 
accompanying text. 
168 See, eg, Qumsieh v Guardianship and Administration Board [1998] VSCA 45 (Unreported, Winneke 
P, Brooking and Ormiston JJA, 17 September 1998); special leave to appeal refused by the High 
Court in Qumsieh v Pilgrim (2000) 21(4) Leg Rep SL 3d. 
169 See above nn 58–60 and accompanying text. It is accepted that this is not always the case, and 
indeed a common law directive may be the product of a more considered decision. The point here is 
why judges might ‘perceive’ a statutory directive to be more reliable. 
170 See Kennedy and Grubb, above n 23, 2037–8. 
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statutory regimes are relatively new and so have not been subject to the same 
judicial consideration as advance directives at common law. 
VII   CO N C L U S I O N 
The presumption when dealing with a valid advance directive refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment must be that such a directive is binding on health 
professionals. The right to self-determination or autonomy requires that the wishes 
of a competent adult be respected and that treatment not be given contrary to that 
directive. However, it is also appropriate for the law to recognise that there are 
circumstances in which a health professional should be excused from following an 
advance directive. The state’s interest in the preservation of life reasonably requires 
that a directive be disregarded, for example, in cases where the directive was based 
on a misunderstanding of the existence of alternative treatments, or where circum-
stances have changed significantly since the directive was completed and the adult 
now has different views.  
The common law and the various statutory jurisdictions achieve this balancing 
exercise between the right to self-determination and the sanctity of life in different 
ways. The common law does not contain a set of specific excuses, relying instead 
on an enquiry as to whether the adult intended the directive to apply to the circum-
stances that ultimately arose. The statutory regimes, on the other hand, tend to 
require adherence to advance directives except where not doing so is specifically 
excused by the legislation. Despite the different approaches at common law and 
under statute, the law generally manages reasonably well the balance between 
respecting autonomy and ensuring that life-sustaining medical treatment is not 
withdrawn inappropriately. 
There are, however, two glaring exceptions. The first is the excuse of good medi-
cal practice that is available under the Queensland legislation.171 It is suggested that 
this part of the law be repealed as it is an inappropriate limit on the right to auton-
omy. One of the critical functions of advance directives is that they allow adults to 
make decisions with which treating health professionals (and others) may disagree. 
An excuse that permits noncompliance with a refusal of treatment based on notions 
of good medical practice defeats that function and should not be recognised. 
The second glaring exception where the balance between the right to self-de-
termination and the sanctity of life is inappropriately weighted arises in relation to 
issues of proof. Concerns have been raised that a bias in favour of the preservation 
of life has meant that courts have generally tried to construe an adult’s advance 
directive very narrowly to prevent it from refusing treatment. Although judgments 
are couched in the language of legal doctrine, one wonders whether a particular 
judge’s personal philosophy and belief system underpins a reluctance to recognise 
an adult’s decision to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. While it is appropri-
ate for doubt about an advance refusal to be resolved in favour of preserving life, 
the authors urge courts to undertake that enquiry more objectively. 
 
 
171 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
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